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Strategic Implementation of “Everyday Low Price” in Electronic 
Markets: A Study of Airline Pricing on the Internet 
 
 
Abstract 
 
An Everyday Low Price (EDLP) strategy is a product-portfolio level pricing strategy by 
which a firm attempts to convey to consumers that prices across its product portfolio are 
consistently low.  Empirically, the EDLP strategy is operationalized along two 
dimensions; the “everyday” component, which relates to the consistency in product prices 
over time, and the “low price” component, which implies that the prices set are on 
average lower than other prices available in the market.  There may, however, be specific 
categories or markets in which even EDLP firms may prefer to eschew their consistency 
and low price goals.  The U.S. domestic airline industry has two airlines that adopt the 
EDLP format while most others employ a promotional (HILO) pricing strategy, thus 
providing a rich context to investigate how the EDLP price-image strategy is 
implemented.  We use a web crawler to gather information on over 270,000 ticket prices 
offered by the major airlines in 472 markets, and use a hierarchical linear model to 
analyze how these two dimensions of price vary with ticket categories and market 
conditions – defined in economics literature by advance purchase periods, weekend 
restrictions, airlines’ competitiveness, market distance, and hub operations.  
We find that the EDLP airlines emphasize the everyday dimension of their pricing 
much more than the low price dimension. Thus while their prices are systematically more 
consistent than their HILO competitors, their price levels show that they practice the 
same form of price discrimination with advance-purchase periods as their HILO 
competitors.  Interestingly, while most airlines charge higher prices for tickets without 
weekend restriction, which are typically targeted towards business travelers, EDLP firms 
charge lower prices for these tickets.  Further investigation at a category level reveals that 
these lower business fares are distinct features of short-haul markets where EDLP firms 
are known to enjoy certain cost advantages due to smaller equipment sizes of their flights.  
From the “everyday” point of view, we see that while there are no differences in the 
consistency of prices of EDLP tickets based on advance purchase periods, prices of 
business-focused EDLP tickets are distinctly more consistent than those of leisure-
oriented tickets.  Curiously, even in markets where EDLP firms are monopolists, they do 
not appear to be exercising their monopoly power; on the other hand, HILO firms 
distinctly employ discriminatory pricing in their monopoly markets.  Perhaps this is a 
reflection of EDLP firms pursuing a limit-pricing/barrier-to-entry strategy.  Our research 
shows that the practice of EDLP in online markets involves strategic variations in how 
price image is communicated. 
 
 
Keywords: Everyday low price (EDLP), competition, airline industry, Internet, 
hierarchical linear models  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many retailers strategically choose to create and maintain a certain price image among 
consumers by employing particular pricing strategies for their product portfolio 
(Ortmeyer et al. 1991).  While “Dollar Stores”, 99 cent price-endings, etc., fall in this 
category, one other key approach is through the employment of specific price-formats; i.e. 
the “everyday low price” (EDLP) and the price-promotion (HILO) format (Bell and 
Lattin 1998).  These price formats are geared towards setting prices for a portfolio of 
products rather than individual ones: while the EDLP strategy is generally associated 
with charging consistent (symbolized by the “everyday” part) and low average prices, the 
HILO strategy is associated with deals, discounts and promotions.  In the retail sector, the 
success of the EDLP strategy is related to the presence of time-constrained consumers 
who are not able or willing to shop around, as well as large basket shoppers whose store 
choice decisions rely heavily on the expected overall basket price (Lal and Rao 1997; 
Bell and Lattin 1998).  Although the practice of EDLP has been studied largely as a 
component of retail competition (mostly in the context of grocery stores and 
supermarkets), Hoch et al. (1994) observe that this price-format is also implemented by 
airlines, automobile manufacturers, warehouse operators and others.  Of these various 
industry contexts, the airline sector in particular provides a rich and interesting context 
for studying the practice of EDLP for several reasons.   
First, there are two prominent airlines, Southwest and JetBlue, that engage in 
EDLP format pricing while most others practice some form promotional pricing.  In fact, 
a recent study in Information Systems (IS) points out that this asymmetry in vendors’ 
portfolio of prices is one important source of overall price dispersion in the market 
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(Chellappa et al. forthcoming).  However, while this work has investigated the impact of 
differential price-image strategies on market-level price dispersion, there is currently 
little or no understanding on how an EDLP strategy is executed.   
Second, two fundamental factors important to the success of EDLP in the physical, 
retail, supermarket context are not observed in the airline industry.  First, the concept of 
“basket-shopping” is irrelevant.  Airline passengers, unlike supermarket shoppers, do not 
shop for a “basket of products” but typically purchase only one or two tickets at a time 
while being repeat purchasers over time. Second, geographical separation from 
competitors is irrelevant because airlines largely sell tickets directly (or through online 
travel agents) to consumers via online channels (Clarkson et al. 2005), lowering search 
costs and making it easy for consumers to compare prices.  As a result, EDLP strategy 
itself might be jeopardized, since EDLP prices are the ones that consumers use as a 
benchmark (reference prices) in their decision to search for deals while comparing prices 
(Yadav and Seiders 1998).  Thus it is important to understand the manner in which EDLP 
might be implemented as these two airlines continue to be successful. 
Third, there are two opposing forces at work when practicing a portfolio pricing 
strategy in contexts where there is ample opportunity to price discriminate.  General 
economic theory, particularly in models of individual product pricing, argues that when 
opportunities to segment on the basis on consumer, product, market, or temporal 
characteristics are available, a firm should engage in price discrimination.  On the other 
hand, the EDLP strategy emphasizes on maintaining consistency in prices and keeping 
prices generally low even if no single firm can consistently offer the lowest prices for all 
products in all markets at all times.  Therefore, it is likely that even EDLP firms may 
 4
Strategic Implentation of EDLP: Airline Pricing on the Internet Sin, Chellappa, Siddarth 
strategically vary their prices depending on the types of products they offer and markets 
they compete in in,  thus positioning themselves differently on the continuum of the two 
price formats as described in extant research (Hoch et al. 1994; Bell and Lattin 1998).  
Finally, the requirement to charge low and consistent prices may also be at loggerheads 
with the economic principles of monopolistic pricing.  EDLP carriers do have 
monopolistic power in some markets, and thus might be expected to charge higher prices 
in those markets.  In fact, Borenstein and Rose (1994) find evidence of monopolistic 
pricing in certain airline routes, although for non-EDLP carriers.  If EDLP firms were to 
engage in monopolistic pricing in those markets, we might expect to observe some 
departure from their overall pricing practice in competitive markets.  Thus, it is important 
investigate how an EDLP firm strategically manages its “everyday” and “low price” 
dimensions of the price-format in different markets. 
To do so, our research first establishes empirical metrics from marketing literature 
to capture these two dimensions.  We also use the existing research on pricing in the 
airline industry to identify different market and competitive conditions that airlines face 
when setting prices.  We develop and estimate hierarchical model that accounts for partial 
dependence among prices due to market- or airline-dependent factors, using pricing data 
for over 270,000 tickets offered by fourteen major carriers in 472 domestic air travel 
markets.  Coefficient estimates from this analysis form the basis of our examination of 
how the price-setting of EDLP firms change with underlying market conditions.  Further, 
we also examine how the underlying low price and everyday dimensions for EDLP 
airlines are different from HILO airlines and change with market conditions.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
motivation for this paper based on relevant theories from existing literature. Section 3 
discusses the data and empirical models employed in this study, which is followed by a 
summary of results in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes with implications and directions for 
future research. 
2. THEORY AND MOTIVATION 
Our research and analysis informed by three streams of literature related to: 1) retail price 
formats; 2) airline pricing and competition; and 3) price discrimination and online pricing. 
 It should first be noted that our knowledge of how price-image strategies are 
implemented comes mainly from previous studies in the marketing literature of how 
grocery stores price packaged goods.  This research has established that the price-image 
of a firm is critical component of  its overall strategy and a key determinant of the types 
of customers a store attracts (Alba et al. 1994; Desai and Talukdar 2003).  A retailer’s 
overall pricing strategy begins with a choice of price format, which typically lie along a 
continuum between the Everyday Low Pricing (EDLP) and Promotional pricing 
(PROMO or HILO) formats (Shankar and Bolton).  EDLP sellers generally provide little 
or no temporal price discounts, while charging prices that are lower than the average 
prices of their HILO competitors.  The marketing literature suggests that EDLP prices 
may be as low as 9% below their HILO counterparts (Hoch et al. 1994).  Their goal is to 
establish a general “low price” image to convince consumers that “regardless of what or 
when you purchase, you can always expect below-average prices at our stores”.  HILO 
sellers, on the other hand, charge   prices that are higher on average while also engaging 
in frequent promotions to undercut EDLP prices.  They emphasize that exceptional 
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values are periodically available at their stores and encourage consumers to visit 
frequently to discover the deals (Lattin and Ortmeyer 1991; Hoch et al. 1994; Lal and 
Rao 1997; Bell and Lattin 1998; Ho et al. 1998).    
Successful implementation of price-image strategies depends upon consumers’ 
price knowledge (or lack thereof) and their (un)willingness to search for deals.   For an 
EDLP airline to be successful, it is essential that either a) a sufficient number of 
consumers are uninformed about lower prices in the market and unwilling to search due 
to high costs of searching, and/or b) EDLP airlines always offer the lowest prices in the 
market.   The second condition is unlikely since it is rare for a firm to always charge the 
lowest price; while the first condition is also increasingly difficult to maintain in an 
industry with intermediaries such as online travel agents that facilitate price comparisons.  
Thus there is sufficient reason to investigate how this strategy is practiced by airlines that 
are proponents of EDLP. 
Theory suggests that the practice of EDLP and HILO can be examined along at 
least two dimensions of their price distributions.  The first is price level (the “low price” 
component of EDLP):  The general idea behind EDLP pricing is that a consumer, without 
searching, would expect EDLP firms to charge lower prices.  Thus a firm practicing 
EDLP should be expected to set prices that are lower than average, irrespective of 
product category.  The second dimension is one of price consistency (the “everyday” part 
of its price image).   EDLP prices are in general more consistent or less variable than 
market prices, and literature finds this to be the case in many retail sectors (Shankar and 
Bolton 2004).  Research in this area also notes that this does not necessarily mean that 
EDLP firms do not offer price discounts, but rather the frequency and magnitudes of 
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discounts offered by EDLP firms are smaller than those of their HILO counterparts.  
Hence while EDLP does not imply constant or static pricing, it is associated with prices 
that are more consistent than those at HILO stores in the market (Hoch et al. 1994; Ho et 
al. 1998; Shankar and Bolton 2004).  These empirical observations are also consistent 
with findings of game-theoretic models of Lal and Rao (1997) and Lattin and Ortmeyer 
(1991), where equilibrium EDLP prices exhibit greater price consistency (less variability) 
and lower price levels.  Thus in the airline context also we should expect more 
consistency in prices of EDLP airlines, perhaps across all different categories it competes 
in. The existing literature has identified a number of factors that influence airline pricing 
such as consumer segments, distance and other market characteristics, and the operational 
and cost structures of airlines.  However, it is important to note that all of these findings 
come from studies of HILO airlines such as American and United, and whether they 
influence EDLP airline pricing in the same way remains an open question. 
Our empirical analysis accounts for the potential influence of these factors and 
provides insights into whether and how the level and consistency of EDLP airline prices 
varies across different market conditions The following sub-sections provides a brief 
discussion of how these factors related to the current research.  Previous research  on 
airline competition as well as recent research in IS has shown that prices are route-
specific, i.e. independent of whether an airline is an EDLP practitioner or not, ticket 
prices (and price distribution) might vary depending upon whether is ticket is LAX-JFK 
or ATL-JFK (Chellappa et al. forthcoming).  However, this work has not examined 
whether and how the price-level  and consistency of EDLP prices might vary between 
these two routes, i.e. do firms strategically alter the manner in which they practice this 
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price format, perhaps because its market power  in each route is different?  In order to 
examine such strategic differentiation by EDLP firms, we need to first understand the 
relevant classification that is followed in this industry. 
2.1 Everyday low pricing and consumer segments 
Airline tickets are defined by many attributes and the same airline offers several ticket 
variants for the same origin-destination pair.  Airlines create differentiated products by 
imposing various restrictions on the tickets and pricing them to target different consumer 
segments based on their willingness to pay (Gale and Holmes 1993; Dana 1998; Stavins 
2001; Clemons et al. 2002).  For example, previous studies have found that ticket prices 
increase closer to the departure date approaches so that consumers with a higher 
opportunity cost of time pay higher prices (Dana 1998; Stavins 2001).  Similarly, prices 
for tickets that include a Saturday night stay-over have been found to be cheaper than 
those that do not impose this requirement  The general rationale behind both advance-
purchase periods and weekend restrictions is that business travelers place a higher value 
on flexibility while leisure travelers will be willing to bear some inconvenience for a 
cheaper price. 
 It is unclear, however, how an airline that is committed to conveying an EDLP 
image will calibrate its prices to take advantage of these natural differences in 
consumers’ willingness to pay.  Will an EDLP airline also charge lower prices for tickets 
purchased well in advance and for those that impose a Saturday night stay-over?   Or will 
it adopt a different approach in order to differentiate themselves from its HILO 
competitors? If it does adopt a different approach, which dimension of its EDLP strategy 
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will it emphasize, “ED” or LP?  These are some of the questions that our research seeks 
to answer.  
2.2 Everyday low pricing, market power and operational infrastructure 
Market characteristics, such as the distance between origin and destination airports or 
whether one of them happens to be a “hub,” have been found to play an important role in 
airlines’ pricing.  Hub-and-spoke systems allow for more efficient use of aircraft, and 
provide additional values to consumers through greater flight frequency and easier 
connections.  Previous research shows that HILO airlines may enjoy market power from 
economies of scale due to large presence in particular airport(s) or route(s), and control 
over scarce resources such as the use of gates and runways (Berry 1990), allowing it to 
command  a price premium from  consumers, while also creating barrier to entry by 
competitors. On the other hand, hub operations may enable an airline to realize cost 
saving due to economies of scale, though these savings may not necessarily be passed on 
to the consumers (Borenstein 1989; Berry et al. 1997).   HILO airlines also calibrate their 
prices based on the competitive environment where intense competition among many 
airlines with small market shares leads to lowering of their prices (Borenstein and Rose 
1994; Hayes and Ross 1998; Stavins 2001).   
While there is ample evidence that hub-based and market share-based pricing is 
quite common in the airline industry, it is not known whether EDLP airlines will also 
prefer to price discriminate based on these elements in the same manner as their HILO 
counterparts, or if their portfolio level pricing strategy will trump any market power 
considerations. 
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From an operational point of view, while large airplanes allow for economies of 
scale for longer flights, variable costs also increase in proportion relative to the fixed 
costs of takeoff and landing (Borenstein 1989; Berry et al. 1997; Hayes and Ross 1998; 
Stavins 2001).   Such operational costs of airlines can play a direct and obvious role in 
ticket prices set by HILO airlines, e.g., higher costs of operation implies higher prices so 
as to cover the expenses of providing services in a given route (Borenstein 1989).  Other 
important factors that influence airlines’ cost are efficiency of aircraft utilization, and 
equipment size and variety.  Aircraft utilization is generally greater in routes with high 
flight frequency, which lowers the per-flight costs and potentially also the ticket prices; 
but at the same time, greater flight frequency lowers frequency delay and increase the 
value of the ticket.  HILO airlines have been known to utilize this factor to command 
higher ticket prices (Borenstein 1989).  
On the other hand, while large aircrafts benefit from economies of scale on fuel in 
long-haul routes, smaller aircrafts may be more cost-effective in short-haul markets due 
to high fixed costs of takeoffs and landings (Borenstein 1989; Berry et al. 1997).  In fact, 
operating and maintaining a small variety of airplanes has been reported as an important 
cost-saving measure (Neels 2000).  Interestingly, EDLP airlines in domestic U.S. market 
generally tend to operate mid-size planes that are most fuel efficient for traveling a non-
stop distance of less than 500 miles.  For example, Southwest Airlines operates only 
Boeing 737 flights with sizes ranging from 122 to 137 seats; while JetBlue Airways 
operate two types of flights: the Airbus A320 with 156 seats, and the EMBRAER 190 
with 100 seats1.  Compared to their HILO counterparts, these airlines potentially enjoy 
                                                 
1 At the time of our data collection, JetBlue had not yet introduced the EMBRARER and was only 
operating the A320. 
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significant cost advantage and logistical efficiency in short-haul markets.  Greater 
equipment variety of HILO carriers also imply significant costs arising from vastly 
different maintenance crews, gates and runways utilization, and different levels of seats 
and services, etc.  What is not known, however, is whether EDLP airlines strategically 
vary their prices based on these distinct differences in operational abilities.  On the one 
hand, EDLP airlines might enjoy the cost advantages but continue their consistent pricing 
approach; while on the other, they could eschew their consistency goal and use these cost 
advantages to undercut competitors’ prices.   Our research empirically investigates the 
strategic variation in pricing that EDLP airlines pursue.  In addition, by carrying out our 
analysis in both competitive and monopoly markets, we also shed light on how 
implementation of the EDLP strategy varies with the competitive environment. 
3. DATA AND METHOD 
In this section, we first discuss the nature of our data and explain the econometric model 
employed in this study.  We then discuss how the everyday and low price dimensions of 
price are operationalized and conclude with a discussion of the variables used in our 
econometric analysis. 
3.1 Data 
Our data is collected from two primary sources.  First, we obtained prices and detail 
descriptions of airline tickets from online travel agents and individual airlines’ websites.  
This raw data was gathered using web-based spiders that we developed using Curl, and 
later processed by a parser that we wrote in Perl and other database scripting languages.  
In addition to the set of major U.S. carriers and online travel agents, a list of the top 500 
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U.S. domestic routes – which account for over 86% of all domestic passenger 
enplanements in the U.S. – was provided as input to the spiders.  The spiders were sent 
out on a daily basis in the third quarter of 2004 to collect price and other attribute 
information for tickets requiring one- to four-week advance purchases, including 
weekday as well as weekend departures and returns.  Our agents operated in parallel and 
submitted identical reservation requests to all online travel agents and airlines’ websites 
simultaneously in order to minimize price variations that may arise from the timing of 
ticket requests.   
Consistent with prior research on airline pricing, we consider only coach class, 
non-refundable, roundtrip tickets.  Further, to control for any price difference that may be 
attributed to differences in flight duration or the number of connections on any given 
route, we restrict our attention to direct, non-stop, flights between an origin and a 
destination.  Since non-stop flights were not available in 28 routes, our final data set 
includes 472 markets and 272,362 unique tickets and final prices, including taxes and 
fees, offered by fourteen network carriers..   
Second, we used the Air Carrier Statistics (Form 41 Traffic and 298C Summary 
Data) and Air Carrier Financial Reports (Schedule P-12) provided by the U.S. Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics to assemble data on airlines’ operational details (e.g. cost per 
available seat-mile, aircraft types and sizes, frequency of flights, etc.), as well as 
information on the respective markets (e.g. origin-destination distance, hub information, 
etc.).  In addition, we used the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) for the 
corresponding routes and carriers in the second and third quarters of 2004 to collect 
information on market share and the number of competing airlines in each origin-
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destination pair from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) for the corresponding 
routes and carriers in the second and third quarters of 2004. DB1B is a 10% sample of all 
airline tickets sold by reporting carriers, including origin, destination and other itinerary 
details of passengers transported.   
When merged with the pricing data, this yielded a complete profile of all relevant 
variables at the ticket level that allowed us to examine the effects of various market- and 
airline-specific factors on airline pricing 
We subsequently divided the full dataset into three subsets to separately analyze 
airlines’ pricing in competitive versus monopoly markets.  The first subset includes 
tickets offered by both EDLP and HILO airlines in 268 markets in which at least two 
airlines compete.  The second subset includes only EDLP observations in 114 markets in 
which EDLP airlines operate.  The third subset includes only HILO observations in 405 
markets that are served by HILO carriers.  Table 1 summarizes the operationalization of 
variables included in this study; and Tables 2 and 3 report descriptive statistics for our 
data. 
3.2 Models 
An important characteristic of the data is that prices of individual tickets (level 1) are 
clustered within groups defined by the airline/route (level).  Thus, prices of tickets 
written by a particular carrier are likely to be correlated due to the underlying pricing 
strategy, or the cost and operational structure of the airline. Similarly, ticket prices of 
different airlines in the same market (defined as a directional origin-destination pair) may 
also be correlated because of the common underlying demand characteristics, competitive 
forces and cost structure for that route.  When data are clustered in this fashion the 
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resulting unit-level random errors are correlated (within group) and heteroscedastic 
(across groups), thus violating two critical assumptions of OLS.   
Hierarchical linear models (HLM) provide a way to overcome these problems by 
extending traditional regression models to account for the partial dependence of 
individual observations within a group and for heterogeneity across groups.  This 
approach has been recommended for the analysis of airline data by Borenstein and Rose 
(1994), as well as in two  recent studies of price dispersion in the area of information 
systems by Venkatesan, Mehta and Bapna (2006) and Chellappa, Sin and Siddarth 
(forthcoming).   
The fundamental idea behind HLM is that separate analyses are performed for 
each of the units at the lowest level of a hierarchical structure, while both individual- and 
group-level unit variances in the outcome measure are examined through simultaneous 
estimation of between-group variances and the effects of independent variables at each 
level.  The total variance in the outcome is then divided into the parameter variance and 
error variance components.  Unlike OLS, hierarchical models estimate residuals from 
different levels separately and account for the covariance structure among group-level 
regression estimates; not only does this provide more accurate group effect estimates than 
traditional methods that systematically underestimate them (Raudenbush and Bryk 1989), 
but it also allows one to model explicitly both within- and between- group variances as 
well as their effects on the outcome while maintaining the appropriate level of analysis 
(Griffin and Hofman 1997).  
One additional advantage of the HLM approach, which is also critical for this 
research, is that it allows us to incorporate airline and market characteristics into the 
 15
Strategic Implentation of EDLP: Airline Pricing on the Internet Sin, Chellappa, Siddarth 
model while still producing accurate estimates of the group-level effects and valid tests of 
confidence intervals (Mendro et al. 1995) – which are typically ignored by OLS (Bryk 
and Thum 1989).  In addressing the multilevel nature of data, traditional fixed effects 
models use dummy variables to “absorb” all heterogeneities across different group units; 
as a result, level-two variables (airline and route characteristics) are excluded from the 
model because they are confounded with the group fixed effects (airline and route 
dummies) and cause multicollinearity problems.  In our current context, this implies that 
airline- and market-specific attributes cannot be explicitly accounted for in a fixed effects 
model, thus largely limiting our ability in drawing inferences on the mediating effects of 
these characteristics on the relationship between other explanatory variables (such as 
pricing strategy) and ticket prices.  While typically this can be resolved by incorporating 
interactions between the explanatory variables and group-level dummies into the model, 
when the number of groups (such as origin-destination pairs) is large, the interaction 
approach becomes impractical as it results in a large number of parameters and over-
identification of the model. 
In the subsequent discussions, we use subscript m to denote a market and 
subscript k to denote a carrier.  Model 1 investigates the “low-price” dimension of EDLP 
using ticket-level prices (dependent variable: ikmprice ), while Model 2 examines the 
“everyday” dimension using the variance in prices of individual carriers within each 
market (dependent variable: ).  We treat both airline and route effects as random in 
Model 1; this is because level-1 units (individual tickets) are cross-classified by two 
separate level-2 units (airline and market).  In Model 2, however, the dependent variable 
kmCV
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is an aggregate measure at the airline level.  Following extant literature we treat only the 
route effect as random (Borenstein and Rose 1994).   
Model 1: The “low-price” dimension 
We employ the log form for most of our explanatory variables because it captures the 
declining marginal effects of these variables on prices, which is consistent with existing 
research on airline pricing as well as the actual pricing practices of airlines.  The only 
exceptions are: 1. dummy variables, because taking log would not be reasonable or 
possible; 2. Market share (RTshare) and the corresponding Herfindahl index (RTherf), 
because it is more reasonable to assume that increase in an airline’s route share would 
have a proportional (rather than declining) effect on price (Borenstein 1989). 
Level 1 (ticket-level) model: 
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The full model (after rearranging terms and renaming the coefficients):  
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where  
 0 0000 0mku u u kmα β= + + +  (4) 
ikmprice(3) is the basic model to be estimated.  The dependent variable Equation  
denotes the price of ticket i offered by carrier k in market (route) m.  Interactions between 
EDLP and various ticket categories (Saturday night stay-over and advance purchase 
periods) and market characteristics (short-haul and hub) are included to capture any 
potential effects on prices set by EDLP airlines as a result of their varying the pricing 
strategy for different product categories or market types. 0β  represents the overall 
intercept;  and  are the random carrier and route effects, respectively.  is the 
random interaction effect.  Finally, 
00ku 00mu 0kmu
ikmε  is the white-noise error particular to the 
individual observation.   
It should be noted that the variable BU  identifies tickets without the Saturday 
night stay-over restriction, which are targeted towards business travelers; it does not 
represents “business class” tickets.  All tickets in our sample are restricted coach class 
tickets.  For brevity and consistency with existing literature (Chellappa et al. 
forthcoming), we shall refer to tickets without weekend restriction as “business tickets”, 
while those that are with such restriction as “leisure tickets”. 
S
Model 2: The “everyday” dimension 
Level 1 (airline-level) model: 
( )
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
2
7 14 21
~ 0,
km m m k m km m km m km m km
m km m km m km m k m km k
km
CV EDLP BUS DD DD DD
freq hub RTshare CASM EQUIPsize
N
m
α α α α α α
α α α α α
ε σ
= + + + + +
+ + + + + + ε  (5) 
Level 2 (market-level) model: 
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  (6) 
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The full model (after rearranging terms and renaming the coefficients):  
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  (7) 
+
where  
 0 0muα β= +  (8) 
The dependent variable in Model 2 is the coefficient of variation of prices, which 
is constructed from the set of all tickets written by an airline in a particular route ( )kmI for 
a given ticket category (defined by ticket restrictions, namely Saturday night stay-over 
and advance purchase period) and market type (defined by short-haul and hub)2: 
( )21 1 1
km
km
I
ikm km I
ikm
km km ikm
ikmkm
price price
I
CV  ,  where price price
Iprice
−−= =
∑ ∑   (9) 
Note that since the unit of analysis in this model is at the carrier-route level, it 
requires that only one random effect be included in the model.  Consistent with 
Borenstein and Rose (1994), we treat the route effect ( ) as random while capturing 
the airline effects using airline-specific variables
0mu
( ) and EDLP CASM .   
                                                 
2 For exposition brevity, superscripts that denote the ticket category and market type are suppressed from 
equations (5)-(9). 
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3.3 Econometric issues 
It is reasonable to expect that an airline’s share of passenger on a route ( )RTshare , as well 
as the Herfindahl index constructed from this variable ( )RTherf , to be endogenous to the 
price that it charges; in fact, a Hausman specification test does reject exogeneity 
for and .  We tackle this problem as follows: at the conceptual level, we 
construct based on market share information obtained from the second quarter of 
2004 (one quarter prior to our data collection); hence it is reasonable to argue that prices 
of tickets offered by an airline (in the current period) is a function of its market share (in 
the previous period), rather than the other way around.  However, if market shares of the 
respective airlines are relatively stable – which is indeed the case for most of the routes – 
then statistically the potentially endogenous variables can still be correlated with the error 
term.  We resolve this issue at the empirical level using instrumental variable and the 
two-stage least square approach.  Following Borenstein (1989) and Borenstein and Rose 
(1994), we use the geometric share of enplanements of an observed carrier at the 
endpoints of a given route as the instrument for its market share, and later use it to 
construct the instrument for RT .  The geometric enplanement share of the observed 
airline on a given route is defined as follows: 
RTshare RTherf
RTshare
herf
i
1 2
1 2
i i
i
j j
j
ENP ENP
GENPSH
ENP ENP
⋅=
⋅∑
 (10)  
where indexes all airlines; and are airline ’s average daily passenger 
enplanements at the two endpoint airports on the observed route during the second 
quarter of 2004.  In other words, is defined as the observed carrier’s geometric 
mean of passenger enplanements at the endpoints of a route divided by the sum of the 
1jENP 2jENPj j
iGENPSH
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geometric mean of each carrier’s enplanements at the endpoint airports across all carriers 
on the observed route. 
We construct the instrument for RT using the square of the fitted value herf
?RTshare  from the first-stage regression, plus a rescaled sum of squares of the shares of all 
other carriers: 
?
( )
?( )2 22 2 11 ii RTherf RTshareIRTherf RTshare RTshareRTshare−= + ⋅ −− i  (11) 
where i indexes the observed airline.  The rationale behind the second term in IRTherf is 
that the concentration of traffic on a route that is not served by the observed airline is 
exogenous to the price of the observed airline; for example, Delta’s price on the Boston–
LaGuardia Airport route does not affect the division of passengers between American and 
United.  The rescaling ensures that the part in a Herfindahl index that is calculated for 
passengers who do not travel on the observed carrier remains unchanged.  We then use 
IRTherf as the excluded exogenous variable in the first-stage regression of RT that 
generates .  
herf
?RTherf
Careful readers may notice that in Model 1, is correlated not with the error 
at the individual ticket level 
RTshare
( )ikmε but instead with the level-2 random interaction 
effect ( ; the reason is that is defined at the carrier-route level, which is ticket-
invariant. Standard procedures in the instrumental variable approach ignore the level-1-
invariant nature of the latent effect, yielding an estimator that is biased at best (and 
inconsistent at worst).  We employ a method that makes use of the information available 
from level-1 exogenous variables in constructing the level-2 instrument based on 
Hausman and Taylor (1981).   The basic idea behind this approach is that the effects of 
) RTshare0kmu
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each level-1 exogenous variable in a level-2 instrument can be approximated by its mean 
at the corresponding level; hence the means of exogenous ticket-varying variables 
(e.g. ), along with other ticket-invariant exogenous variables (e.g.7DD freq ), can be use as 
instruments for the endogenous ticket-invariant variables.  Similar approach has been 
used in various contexts such as studies on the sales of the cereal products (Nevo 2001) 
and diffusion of new pharmaceutical drugs (Desiraju et al. 2004).  
4. RESULTS 
In order to specifically assess the impact of competition on the EDLP strategy, we 
separately analyze markets in which either the EDLP airlines or the HILO airlines are 
monopolists. Section 4.1 discusses the model specification tests from our investigation of 
competitive markets (at least one EDLP and one HILO airline present). These include the 
multicollinearity test, Hausman test, and robustness tests based on analysis on the 
residuals, as well as various goodness of fit indexes (due to space consideration we 
present results from our specification tests only for model 1).  Further, we explain how 
we arrive at the final coefficients from which we draw inferences in sections 4.2 to 4.4.  
Section 4.2 compares the pricing behaviors of EDLP carriers to those of their HILO 
counterparts.  Section 4.3 discusses the strategic variation in the two dimensions of EDLP, 
namely “everyday” and “low price”, respectively.  Section 4.4 examines the potential 
monopolistic pricing behaviors of EDLP and HILO airlines separately. 
4.1 Test of Model Specification and Robustness 
The two highest VIF values are 5.32 and 4.94, both below the critical level of 10, which 
indicates that multicollinearity is not an issue in our model.  Further, Hausman tests were 
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performed for the route random effects and airline random effects.  The null hypothesis is 
equality of fixed- and random-effects estimates.  The resulting test statistic is 0.1673, 
which falls well below the critical value of 29.14 at the 99 percent confidence level for a 
Chi-square with 14 degrees of freedom3.  These statistics indicate that the coefficient 
estimates from the random effects model are not significantly different from those that 
are obtained from the fixed effects model, and that the random effects specification 
produces consistent results.  Further, from the first three rows in Table 4 we can observe 
that the estimates of the airline- and route-route random effects are highly significant 
from the Null HLM.  These statistics suggest that ticket prices are clustered within both 
carrier and route; hence the results obtained from the fixed effects model would likely be 
misleading.  The last four rows in Table 4 compare the goodness of fit for three different 
specifications of Model 1: The two-stage least square with fixed effects (2SLS), the null 
hierarchical model (Null HLM), and the full cross-classified hierarchical model (Full 
HLM); the former two serve as baseline models for comparison.   
The Full HLM fits the data better than the fixed effects model (2SLS) based on 
both BIC and the sum of residual-squared errors criteria; the sum of squared errors of the 
Full HLM is lower than that of the fixed effects model by 5.95%.  The amounts of 
reduction in variance components ? τ? , and ?,ϕ ψ  suggest that 72.05% of explainable 
variation in carrier means, 20.65% of explainable variation in route means, and 24.69% 
of explainable variation in the carrier-route means are explained by the variables 
incorporated in the Full HLM.  In addition, the random error is reduced by 14.90% 
                                                 
3 The set of explanatory variables used in the Hausman test are: BUS, DD7, DD14, DD21, lnfreq, hub, 
RTshare, lnEQUIPsize, EDLP*BUS, EDLP*DD7, EDLP*DD14, EDLP*DD21, EDLP*shorthaul, and 
EDLP*hub.  Variables that are captured by either airline- or route-fixed effects are excluded. 
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compared to the null model.  All statistics indicate that the chosen variables provide 
excellent explanations for the pricing of airline tickets in the sample. 
As previously stated, the econometric specification of Model 1 pertains to the 
analysis of the “low-price” dimension and provides insights about EDLP price levels 
relative to their competitors.  The raw coefficient estimates of this model are presented in 
Table 5.  Because the model includes several variables that interact with the EDLP 
dummy, care must be taken in inferring the main and interaction effects and in deriving 
overall implications from the model.   
Table 5 shows that main effect of EDLP is positive and significant. The 
interpretation of this coefficient, which takes into account the baseline values of all the 
dummies in this model, is that EDLP prices of the 4-week advance purchase leisure 
tickets for non-hub long-haul sectors are higher than HILO prices for tickets in the same 
category.  In other words, overall EDLP airlines do not necessarily price lower than their 
HILO counterparts, i.e., not only does “low price” not mean lowest prices, but indeed 
EDLP prices can even be higher under certain circumstances.  Along the same lines, the 
EDLP coefficient in Table 8 4  (raw coefficient estimates from Model 2), can be 
interpreted to mean that EDLP prices are more consistent than HILO prices for 4-week 
advance purchase tickets and non-hub, long-haul sectors. 
 Tables 6 and 9 provide a “within airlines” analysis that shows respectively how 
price levels and price consistency of tickets in the first column differ from those in the 
baseline column.  The coefficient estimates reported in Tables 6 are 9 obtained by 
summing the raw coefficient estimates of the corresponding variables that appear in 
Tables 5 and 8, respectively.  The standard errors for the final estimates are calculated 
                                                 
4  Flight frequency (freq) has been dropped from the analysis due to multicollinearity problem. 
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using the corresponding elements in the variance-covariance matrix of the Beta 
coefficients as follows: 
( ) ( )S.E. 2cov ,i i
i i j
Var jβ β β
≠
= +∑ ∑    
For example, the first row in Table 6 compares EDLP airlines’ prices for business tickets 
(without weekend restriction), versus those for their own leisure tickets (with weekend 
restriction) – which is the baseline for comparison.  The effects of the former can be 
assessed by summing the intercept, , , and EDL ( )0 1 2 13i.e. β β β β+ + + EDLP BUS P BUS× , 
while those of the latter can be assessed by summing the intercept and EDLP ( )0 1i.e. β β+ .  
The difference between the two, 2 13β β+ =−0.1219, represents the effect of interest; and 
the standard error is calculated as ( ) ( ) ( )2 13 22cov ,Var Var 13β β β+ + β .   
Similarly, the first row, column 1, in Table 7 compares EDLP airlines’ prices for 
business, one-week advance purchase tickets in short-haul, non-hub markets versus those 
for the same type of tickets in the same type of market offered by HILO airlines.  The 
effects of the former can be assessed by summing the intercept, , , , EDLP BUS 7DD
, , , and ED  shorthaul EDLP BUS× 7EDLP DD× LP shorthaul×
( )0 1 2 3 10 13 14 17i.e. β β β β β β β β+ + + + + + +  while those of the latter can be assessed by 
summing , , and ( )0 2 3 10i.e. β β β β+ + + .  The difference between the two, BUS 7DD shorthaul
1 13 14 17β β β β+ + + =
)
−0.2933, represents the effect of interest; and the standard error is 
calculated as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
1 13 14 17
1 13 1 14 1 17 13 14 13 17 142cov , 2cov , 2cov , 2cov , 2cov , 2cov ,
Var Var Var Varβ β β β
17β β β β β β β β β β β
+ + +
+ + + + + + β .   
The remaining numbers presented in Tables 6, 7, 9, 10 are obtained in a similar fashion. 
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Tables 7 and 10 present a “between airline” analysis, which contrasts the 
performance of EDLP and HILO airlines on each dimension while Tables 6 and 9 
provide a “within airline” analysis provide insights into how the pricing dimensions of 
EDLP airline vary by product, and market conditions. We discuss these findings in 
sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.   
4.2 EDLP strategy vis-à-vis HILO pricing 
Our first goal is to examine where there is any statistical difference between EDLP and 
HILO prices and their distribution.  In general, we should expect that EDLP prices are on 
average lower than their HILO counterparts, while being more consistent.  If it is not so 
then it lends credence the earlier arguments that just because a firm subscribes to the 
EDLP strategy it does not necessarily forego the opportunity to discriminate. 
Table 7 compares price levels of EDLP and HILO airlines for various categories.  
EDLP business tickets are cheaper than their HILO competitors for short-haul markets 
while they are actually consistently higher for leisure tickets.  In short-haul markets, 
business tickets offered by EDLP airlines are significantly cheaper, ranging from 18.28% 
(for three-week advance purchase) to 25.42%5 (for one-week advance purchase) than 
those offered by their HILO counterparts for all advance-purchase periods.  However, 
leisure ticket prices in short-haul markets are not statistically different from those of their 
HILO counterparts.   Interestingly in long-haul markets EDLP leisure tickets are 
statistically different and higher than HILO leisure tickets for all advance purchase 
periods.  For example, EDLP leisure ticket prices might be between 20.33% and 51.28% 
higher than HILO leisure tickets, depending upon the advance purchase period.  Thus 
                                                 
5 The relative effect of a dichotomous variable coefficient (c) on the dependent variable in semi-logarithmic 
equations is 100*(exp(c)-1) (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980). 
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there is clear evidence that there are at least some market categories where EDLP airlines 
do not subscribe to the “low price” component of their strategy. 
In contrast, when comparing the consistency of EDLP and HILO prices, from 
Table 10 we can clearly see that EDLP price distributions are narrower than those of their 
HILO competitors.  Except in a few situations, we see that EDLP prices, be it leisure or 
business, for all advance purchase periods, are more consistent than comparable HILO 
prices.  The obvious suggestion from this result is the fact that EDLP airlines do take the 
“everyday” component of their strategy quite seriously and do not seem to offer deals or 
raise their prices in the same way that HILO firms do.  However, the fact that there is 
non-zero variation should also tell us that EDLP does not mean static pricing. 
4.3 Variance in EDLP strategy 
As previously discussed, Table 6 reveals how the price level of EDLP airlines changes 
based on the conditions it faces.   First, note that after controlling for all route-effects, 
EDLP airlines price their business tickets lower than their own leisure tickets by almost 
11.5%.  Interestingly, this finding runs counter to what the literature had documented 
about HILO airlines whose leisure tickets, i.e. those that impose a Saturday night 
restriction, are usually offered at a discount.  On the other hand, when we consider EDLP 
strategy in the presence of consumers with different willingness to pay, we observe that 
consistent with practice described by extant literature, ticket prices go up.  For example, 
the prices of EDLP tickets increase from 8.84% (for tickets purchased three weeks in 
advance) to up to 34.15% (for tickets purchased within the same week as the departure 
date) over the baseline 4-week advance purchase period6.   
                                                 
6 Pairwise t-tests reveals that the coefficients DD7, DD14, and DD21 are statistically different. 
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Table 6 also reveals that ticket prices for short-haul tickets are almost 35% lower 
than in long-haul markets (almost 35% lower).  As discussed earlier, EDLP short-haul 
prices for business tickets are less than HILO prices, while for leisure tickets they are 
higher.  So while EDLP airlines do have lower prices from shorter distances, they 
strategically use their equipment size (which are fuel efficient and ideally suited for 
short-haul distances of less than 500 miles) to undercut competition in the business sector.   
Thus by passing on the savings to these consumers, they are able to aggressively promote 
their “low price” image to stave off competition.  
Interestingly, from a price consistency perspective (Table 9), we see little 
variance in how EDLP price distributions look.  Except for business tickets, which appear 
to be more consistent (lower coefficient of variation), the coefficients for other categories 
are statistically insignificant.  Overall, the fact that five of six comparisons in Table 6 are 
statistically different, compared to only one of six in Table 9,  suggests that with respect 
to projecting a price image, the ED dimension of pricing (i.e., price consistency) is more 
important to EDLP airlines than the LP dimension (price level).  
4.4 Monopoly pricing and EDLP strategy 
While our earlier analysis was restricted to airlines’ practice of the EDLP strategy when 
facing competition, we also wish examine the nature of this pricing strategy when 
endowed with monopoly power.  We conduct analyses with two subsets of our data: the 
first consists of all routes in which EDLP carriers were present, while the second contains 
all routes in which HILO carriers competed.  EDLP carriers were in a monopoly position 
in 59 of the 114 markets in the first dataset, while HILO carriers had a monopoly position 
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7in 42 of 405 markets in the second dataset .  We apply the same models that are 
presented in section 3.2 with the following exceptions: 1. the EDLP main effect as well 
as all interaction effects are omitted from the model, since the new subsets of data consist 
of only one group of airlines (either EDLP or HILO) each; 2. A new dummy variable that 
identifies monopoly markets (EDLPmono and HILOmono for the two data sets, 
respectively) is added, and subsequently, RTshare and RTherf are dropped due to their 
obvious collinearity with this new variable; 3. The airline effects are treated as fixed 
rather than random, because the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient estimates derived from the airline random and fixed effects models being not 
statistically different for the corresponding sets of data; and 4. EQUIPsize is dropped 
from our analysis of the EDLP data subset due to multicollinearity issues. 
The results of our analysis on the EDLP data are presented in Tables 11 and 12, in 
which the dependent variables are ticket price and coefficient of variation respectively.  
Note that the coefficient estimates for EDLPmono are insignificant in both tables.  This 
suggests that the EDLP airlines do not engage in any particular monopolistic pricing 
strategy and continue to operate in a similar fashion as in other markets.  While 
empirically an interesting observation, there could potentially be a number of plausible 
explanations, including the possibility of limit pricing or barrier-to-entry type strategy.  
Alternatively EDLP firms may fear wrong signals being sent to the market if deals and 
promotions were created even if only for these markets.  Further research is required to 
investigate this peculiar behavior, and is beyond the scope of the current research. 
                                                 
7 EDLP and HILO carriers overlap in 47 markets; hence the sum of the number of markets in which the two 
respective types of carriers operate exceed 500. 
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The above results take significant meaning, particularly in light of results in 
Tables 13 and 14 that present the results of our analysis on the HILO data.  We can 
clearly observe that the coefficient estimate for HILOmono in Table 13 is positive and 
significant while in Table 14 it is negative and significant.  This suggests clear 
monopolistic pricing by HILO firms as might be expected from economic theories of 
monopoly pricing.  HILO airlines not only charge higher prices in markets where they are 
the monopoly (higher by 15.38%), but they also seem to restrict the range of prices they 
offer, i.e. little or no deals and promotions as compared to their behavior in competitive 
markets. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Pricing is a complex decision that involves the consideration of costs, product and market 
characteristics, as well as competition.  The price image of a firm, is a critical component 
of its overall strategy which influences the types of customers that it attracts and, 
ultimately, its profitability (Alba et al. 1994; Desai and Talukdar 2003).  While a 
significant body of academic research on pricing has focused at the product level, in 
reality pricing is a firm-level strategy – firms not only need to determine prices for a 
portfolio of products, but they also need to make choices regarding when, how much and 
how often to vary prices.  There has been relatively little research to understand how 
product level prices may relate to the overall pricing strategy and the price image of the 
firm, and our research aims to fill this gap. 
EDLP is a well-known pricing strategy that can enhance the price-credibility of 
vendors and lead to higher consumer confidence and loyalty (Ortmeyer et al. 1991).  Two 
carriers in the airline industry are practitioners of the EDLP strategy, thus providing a 
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useful context to study how this strategy is implemented. Air travel, after all, is not a one-
time affair for most consumers but is replete with repeat-purchase experiences.  Thus, in 
addition to the short-term impact of any price-setting, firms have to be concerned about 
the long-term perceptions and expectations of consumers with regards to their prices.  
From a price-image point of view, the strategy of a firm practicing EDLP is to create the 
expectation of low price for a consumer without needing to search extensively.  Note that 
there are two key aspects to an EDLP strategy; the “everyday” component that refers to 
the consistency approach in pricing (to create a uniform and permanent belief amongst 
consumers), and the “low price” component that aims to provide the perception that the 
firm’s prices are in the lower end of the market spectrum.  For obvious reasons, no firm 
can always offer the lowest price in a market; hence it can only be expected that an EDLP 
firm can be “found out” online given the relative ease of search on the Internet.  So the 
question of how EDLP is adapted to different market conditions becomes a particularly 
interesting one. 
Industry reports suggest that firms rarely practice a strict EDLP or HILO price 
format; instead, they often incorporate different elements of both strategies into their 
actual pricing (Radice 1998).  Interestingly, academic views on the adoption of a 
“hybrid” price format are mixed.  On one hand, Ho et al. (1998) and Shankar and Bolton 
(2004) argue that practicing EDLP in a subset of products allows the firm to capitalize on 
differences in consumer demand within and across categories; on the other, Hoch et al. 
(1994) suggest that the benefits of a low price image accrue only if EDLP is implemented 
on a chain-wide basis.    
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We find strong evidence that a firm does not implement EDLP in the same 
fashion for the entire market; rather it employs segment-specific strategies depending 
upon various market conditions and segment categories.  While there is some anecdotal 
evidence of this type of strategic behavior in the grocery industry, little is known about 
such a practice in the online context.  Our results suggest that EDLP airlines focus their 
low price strategy on particular market segments (business-travels and short-haul 
markets), while being overall consistent in their prices relative to the HILO competitors.  
On the other hand, for leisure tickets, we observe that prices offered by EDLP airlines are 
more expensive than those offered by HILO airlines in long-haul markets.  Based on the 
success of Southwest and JetBlue, our findings may indicate that successful 
implementation of the EDLP strategy does not necessarily imply that airlines need to 
forgo their ability to price discriminate when such opportunity is available.  Further, our 
empirical results suggest that firms appear to believe that EDLP is perpetuated more by 
the “ED” part rather than the “LP” part, even though it is in fact the low price dimension 
that is under serious threat in a low search cost environment such as in electronic markets. 
Further, our results offer interesting insights to the installed base argument 
proposed by Hoch et al. (1994), in which they suggest that “The greater the installed base, 
the more difficult it will be to make EDLP pay out… because EDLP requires forgoing 
significant profit dollars from the installed base in search of new opportunity.” (p.23)  
Our analysis of EDLP airlines’ pricing in competitive versus monopoly markets (where 
the airlines have a large installed base of customers) reveal that these airlines do not 
exercise the monopoly power that they enjoy in those markets.  This is an important 
finding in that it stands in contrast to the generic strategic preferences of a firm with 
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regards to pricing.  Even though economic intuition suggests that firms prefer to 
discriminate, e.g., charge higher prices in a tighter market and lower prices when they 
face competition, an EDLP firm is still constrained to maintaining this image – and it 
appears that EDLP airlines are creating barriers to entry by HILO competitors in markets 
where they enjoy monopoly power through employing the same price-image strategy as 
in competitive markets.  
Another important observation to take note of is the fact that no EDLP airline 
offers its tickets through any of the online travel agents (OTA) such as Orbitz, 
Travelocity or Expedia.  This is analogous to Wal-Mart’s choice of location in the 
physical world: Wal-Mart, the well-known EDLP retail giant, deliberately locates its 
stores away from malls and other competitors who engage in frequent price discounts. By 
making it costly for consumers to compare prices across different stores, Wal-Mart is 
able to avoid head-to-head competition and defend their “always low prices” claim even 
when its prices may not be the lowest for any particular product.  While in the physical 
world EDLP firms can establish such physical barriers to consumer search, the advent of 
electronic markets poses serious challenges to the practice of EDLP and its overall 
effectiveness in managing a “low price” perception.  In electronic markets, airlines are 
essentially co-located in the same space as the transport costs associated with physical 
distance are absent in the online environment.  Joining an OTA, while increasing the size 
of the potential market, also opens up a firm to price-based competition.  Interestingly, 
Southwest and JetBlue were the only two airlines that require consumers to visit their 
websites directly to obtain flight schedules and pricing information.  In fact, both airlines 
adopted various technological attempts in preventing search engines from finding out 
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8about their prices .  Effectively EDLP airlines appear to create barriers to searching 
through segment-specific implementation of EDLP and avoidance of direct comparison.  
Further, the manner in which EDLP are implemented show that a combination of the 
“everyday” and “low price” component makes up for an effective differentiation strategy.  
The final element of our research that is of both academic and managerial 
importance is the link connecting the operational aspects of airlines and their pricing 
strategy.  As Hoch et al. (1994) point out, “Price is not a defensible point of 
differentiation for a firm unless it already has the appropriate operating cost structure in 
place.” (p.26).  Indeed, it is suggested some airlines like American do not pursue EDLP 
as operational infrastructure is not suited to its practice (O'Brien 1993). Operational costs 
vary widely among airlines and from market to market (depending on whether the airline 
has a hub on a given route, etc.), directly impacting the pricing structure of airlines and 
their ability to pursue a universal low-price strategy.  Our findings show that the adoption 
of an EDLP format is closely associated with low variance in various operational 
infrastructures and relatively low cost per available seat mile.  Note that however 
plausible these rationales may be, it is still difficult to make a causal argument with 
regards to cost-to-pricing versus pricing-to-cost, i.e. whether firms with low operational 
costs tend to choose EDLP, or an EDLP format leads to low operational costs – on one 
hand, one could argue that greater the cost advantage an airline achieves through 
operational efficiencies, the better it is able to adhere to an EDLP strategy. On the other 
hand, the greater the degree to which an airline practice EDLP, the better it may be able 
to stabilize/assess demand, making it less necessary to maintain a fleet of various 
different plane types and sizes, thus reducing costs.  In the airline industry where a large 
                                                 
8 JetBlue has recently started to make their offers available on major OTAs. 
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capital investment is necessary, we could perhaps state that firms choose operational 
infrastructure (cost) first and pricing second. 
5.1 Limitations and future research 
Our study is one of the first to examine the practice of price-image through EDLP in an 
online context.  Though this study provides useful insights on the strategic 
implementation of EDLP in electronic markets, it is subject to a number of limitations 
while at the same time opening up interesting opportunities for future research.  First, our 
analysis did not include information on promotions or deals because it was not available 
for a majority of routes, airlines, and ticket requests.  As a result, we were not able to 
incorporate a number of marketing mix variables in explaining differences in airlines' 
pricing strategies.  While omission of these variables may potentially inflate the role of 
competitive and cost factors in our results, it should be noted that we have extensively 
collected all prices offered by the airlines for each particular ticket request; any such 
promotion or discount would have been reflected in the actual prices being offered by 
each individual airline.  Hence the issues regarding inflation are likely to be limited.  
Second, we do not have demand information and in essence, we do not know which (and 
how many) consumers were exposed to which offer.  It would be desirable to track the 
entire search process, i.e. where consumers begin and end their search, so that we may 
explicitly model the consumer decision process and obtain insights on the relative 
profitability of EDLP vs. HILO in electronic markets.    Third, the models that we 
developed in this paper are descriptive in nature and are based primarily on prior 
theoretical assumptions and classifications of price format dimensions.  Therefore, our 
inferences on the strategic pricing behaviors of airlines are limited to the observed 
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differences between our estimations and those suggested by traditional understandings of 
EDLP practices. Yet, we hope that by integrating the various elements from existing 
literature on price format, our models can provide a comprehensive framework for further 
empirical explorations. 
From the travel industry point of view, it would be prudent to examine the many 
bundling strategies practiced by OTAs and how they may affect the feasibility of EDLP.  
Further, it is also important to investigate if there are any differences in online EDLP 
practices across different vendors, brand-types, and industries.  While our study offers 
some initial understanding of the practice of EDLP in online airline markets, generalizing 
this research to other industries is much needed.  Particular attention is called for in the 
retailing of books, music, and electronic products etc. that constitutes significant portions 
of the $102.1 billion online retail spending in the U.S. in 2006 alone.  
Finally, the broader questions of how the nature of the low search cost distribution 
channel may affect the complex relationships among price format adoption, price-image 
of a firm, competition, consumer price sensitivity and purchase intention, and 
consequently the “optimal mix” (in terms of profitability) of various EDLP and HILO 
elements will be fruitful avenues for future research.   
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Appendix: Tables 
Table 1: Description of Variables 
Factor Variable Related Literature Explanation 
Saturday night 
stay-over 
requirement 
(BUS)  
BUS = 1 if the observed ticket does not include a Saturday night stay-over requirement; 0 
otherwise. Ticket 
Categories & 
Consumer 
Segments 
(Gale and Holmes 1993; 
Dana 1998; Stavins 
2001; Clemons et al. 
2002) 
  
DD7 = 1 if the observed ticket is generated within 0-7 days of departure date; 0 otherwise.  
DD14 = 1 if the observed ticket is generated within 7-14 days of departure date; 0 otherwise. Advance 
purchase period DD21 = 1 if the observed ticket is generated within 14-21 days of departure date; 0 
otherwise. (DD7, DD14, 
DD21) 
(Borenstein 1989; Berry 
et al. 1997; Hayes and 
Ross 1998; Stavins 2001) 
shorthaul = 1 if the non-stop distance between the origin and the destination airports on the 
observed route is equal to or less than 500 miles; 0 otherwise. 
Distance 
(shorthaul) Market 
Characteristics (Borenstein 1989; 
Borenstein and Rose 
1994) 
Herfindahl Index RTherf is the Herfindahl index for all passengers on the observed route. (RTherf) 
(Borenstein 1989; 
Borenstein 1991; Berry 
et al. 1997; Hayes and 
Ross 1998) 
hub = 1 if the origin and/or destination airport(s) in a given route is (are) a hub(s) for the 
observed airline; 0 otherwise. 
Hub  
(hub) 
Market 
Power (Borenstein 1989; 
Borenstein and Rose 
1994) 
Market Share RTshare is the observed carrier’s share of passengers on the observed route. (RTshare) 
(Borenstein and Rose 
1994; Hayes and Ross 
1998) 
freq is the observed carrier’s weekly average number of flights scheduled for departure from 
the origin to the destination on a given route. 
Frequency  
(freq) 
Cost per available 
seat-mile  
(CASM) 
(Borenstein 1989) CASM is the cost per available seat-mile (in cents) of the observed airline. 
Operational/ 
Cost Structure 
EQUIPsize is the average size of the aircrafts operated by the observed airline on a given 
route. 
Aircraft Size (Borentein 1989) (EQUIPsize) 
EDLP = 1 if the ticket is offered by an EDLP airline (Southwest or JetBlue); 0 otherwise. Price-format  EDLP New variable 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on the Full Sample (N=272,362) 
 MEAN STD Min Max Correlation Matrix 
Price 328.16 265.88 89.00 2959.00 1.00  
EDLP  0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 −0.42 1.00  
BUS 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.02 1.00  
DD7 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.01 −0.01 1.00  
DD14 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.33 1.00  
DD21 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 −0.09 0.00 0.00 −0.33 −0.34 1.00 
freq 42.40 39.61 0.00 192.08 −0.21 0.36 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.00 1.00
hub 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.03 −0.08 −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 1.00
RTshare 0.54 0.31 0.00 1.00 −0.23 0.49 0.01 0.00 −0.02 0.01 0.57 0.28 1.00
RTherf 0.57 0.22 0.00 1.00 −0.31 0.48 0.02 0.01 −0.02 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.68 1.00
shorthaul 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 −0.44 0.29 0.02 0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.04 −0.07 0.20 0.37 1.00
CASM 11.59 2.56 6.13 16.13 0.25 −0.55 −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 −0.33 −0.04 −0.39 −0.28 −0.06 1.00
EQUIPsize 139.21 21.40 72.00 249.00 0.02 −0.06 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 −0.09 0.03 0.01 −0.21 −0.09 1.00
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Selected Operational Details – EDLP vs. HILO Carriers 
  Min Mean Max Variance
EDLP 
Carriers 1 1 1 0 Number of Different Types of Aircraft 
Operated9 HILO Carriers 2 4.33 8 4.79 
EDLP 
Carriers 6.13 6.87 7.6 1.08 Cost Per Available 
Seat Mile (in cents) HILO 
Carriers 7.26 10.89 16.13 7.27 
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9 Different sub-models or configurations under the same model (e.g. Boeing 737-400 and Boeing 737-500) are considered as the same type of aircraft. 
Table 4: Comparison of Goodness of Fit 
Estimate 
(standard error) 
Model 
 
Effect/Index 2SLS NULL HLM FULL HLM 
0.01145** 0.0032** ?ϕ --  (Airline Random Effect) (0.0053) (0.0019) 
0.1705*** 0.1353*** τ? --  (Route Random Effect) (0.0158) (0.0125) 
0.02045*** 0.0154*** ?ψ --  (Random Interaction Effect) (0.0015) (0.0012) 
0.1115*** 0.1235*** 0.1051*** ?2σ  (Residual) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
 
−2LL 136716 159762 125876 
 
BIC 136728 159762 125876 
 
Sum of Residual-Squared 23332.43 25798.27 21944.30 
*p<  0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p< .01 (Same notation for all tables) 
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Table 5: Results of Model 1 – Price Level Table 6: Interpretation of Effects –  
The “Low Price” Dimension of EDLP Estimate Variable (standard error) Estimate Effect Baseline 
Intercept 5.7589*** (0.3875) 
(S.E.) 
Leisure tickets (with 
weekend restriction) 
−0.1219*** BUS 
EDLP 0.1931*** (0.0694) 
(0.0074) 
Four-week advance 
purchase tickets 
0.2938*** DD7 
BUS 0.1255*** (0.0015) 
(0.0104) 
Four-week advance 
purchase tickets 
0.1252*** DD14 
DD7 0.3018*** (0.0021) 
(0.0105) 
Four-week advance 
purchase tickets 
0.0847*** DD21 
DD14 0.0772*** (0.0021) 
(0.0104) 
−0.4302*** shorthaul Long-haul markets 
DD21 0.0014 (0.0020) 
(0.1073) 
ln(freq) −0.0240*** (0.0036) 
hub −0.0649*** (0.0230) 
?RTshare  0.1667*** (0.0822) 
?RTherf  −1.5675*** (0.3659) 
shorthaul −0.1993*** (0.0775) 
ln(CASM) 0.3611*** (0.0803) 
ln(EQUIPsize) −0.0408 (0.0621) 
EDLP BUS×  −0.2474*** (0.0075) 
7EDLP DD×  −0.0080 (0.0106) 
14EDLP DD×  0.0480*** (0.0107) 
21EDLP DD×  0.0834*** (0.0106) 
EDLP shorthaul×  −0.2310**** (0.0825) 
EDLP hub×  0.1375 (0.0975) 
  
N 209558 
−2LL 125875.8 
 
hub Non-hub markets 0.0726 (0.0949) 
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Table 7: Comparison of Price Level – EDLP vs. HILO Carriers  
(D.V. = Price; Baseline = HILO) 
Short-haul Market Type 
 
 
Ticket Category Non-hub Markets Hub Markets 
Weekend Restriction Business Leisure Business Leisure 
DD7 0.0916 −0.2933*** −0.0459 −0.1558 
DD14 0.0101 0.1476 −0.2373** −0.0998 
DD21 0.0455 0.1830 −0.2019** −0.0644 
DD28 0.0996 −0.2853*** −0.0379 −0.1478 
Long-haul Market Type  
 
Ticket Category Non-hub Markets Hub Markets 
Weekend Restriction Business Leisure Business Leisure 
DD7 0.1851*** 0.0752 0.3226*** −0.0623 
DD14 0.2411*** 0.1312 0.3786*** −0.0063 
DD21 0.0291 0.2765*** 0.1666 0.4140*** 
DD28 0.1931*** 0.0832 0.3306*** −0.0543 
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Table 9: Interpretation of Effects –  Table 8: Results of Model 2 – 
Coefficient of Variation The “Everyday” Dimension of EDLP 
Estimate  (standard error) Estimate Effect Baseline (S.E.) 0.0568 Intercept (0.0411) Leisure tickets (with 
weekend 
restriction) 
−0.0329** BUS 
EDLP −0.0847*** (0.0229) (0.0167) 
Four-week advance 
purchase tickets 
0.0406* 
BUS −0.0646*** (0.0036) DD7 (0.0237) 
Four-week advance 
purchase tickets 
0.0104 
DD7 0.0654*** (0.0051) 
DD14 (0.0236) 
Four-week advance 
purchase tickets 
0.03343 
DD14 0.0537*** (0.0051) 
DD21 (0.0236) 
−0.0371 
DD21 0.0070 (0.0051) 
shorthaul Long-haul markets (0.0302) 
hub 0.0059 (0.0075) 
?RTshare  0.0567** (0.0231) 
?RTherf  0.0138 (0.0778) 
shorthaul 0.0032 (0.0162) 
CASM 0.0059*** (0.0010) 
EQUIPsize 0.0000 (0.0001) 
EDLP BUS×  0.0317* (0.0171) 
7EDLP DD×  −0.0248 (0.0243) 
14EDLP DD×  −0.0434* (0.0242) 
21EDLP DD×  0.0265 (0.0242) 
EDLP shorthaul×  −0.0403 (0.0275) 
EDLP hub×  0.0264 (0.0395) 
  
N 5422 
−2LL −6158.1 
 
hub Non-hub markets 0.0324 (0.0387) 
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Table 10: Comparison of Price Variability – EDLP vs. HILO Carriers  
(D.V. = Coefficient of Variation; Baseline = HILO) 
Short-haul Market Type 
 
 
Ticket Category Non-hub Markets Hub Markets 
Weekend Restriction Business Leisure Business Leisure 
DD7 −0.1181*** −0.1498*** −0.0917** −0.1234*** 
DD14 −0.1367*** −0.1684*** −0.1102*** −0.1419*** 
DD21 −0.0669** −0.0985*** −0.0404 −0.0721* 
DD28 −0.0933*** −0.1250*** −0.0669* −0.0986** 
Long-haul Market Type  
 
Ticket Category Non-hub Markets Hub Markets 
Weekend Restriction Business Leisure Business Leisure 
DD7 −0.0778*** −0.1095*** −0.0514 −0.0831* 
DD14 −0.0963*** −0.1280*** −0.0699 −0.1016** 
DD21 −0.0265 −0.0582** −0.0001 −0.0318 
DD28 −0.0530** −0.0847*** −0.0265 −0.0582 
(Negative values represent higher price consistency) 
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Table 11: EDLP Prices in Competitive vs. 
Monopoly Markets – Price Level 
Table 12: EDLP Prices in Competitive vs. 
Monopoly Markets – Price Variability 
Variable Estimate (standard error) 
Estimate Variable (standard error) 
Intercept 5.1495*** (0.4803) 
0.2779*** Intercept (0.0466) 
weekday −0.1153*** (0.0019) 
−0.0358*** weekday (0.0039) 
DD7 0.2666*** (0.0027) 
0.0360*** DD7 (0.0056) 
DD14 0.0248*** (0.0028) 
0.0175*** DD14 (0.0055) 
DD21 0.0386*** (0.0027) 
0.0273*** DD21 (0.0056) 
ln(freq) −0.0114 (0.0152) 
0.0007*** freq (0.0001) 
hub 0.0783 (0.0487) 
−0.0119 hub (0.0089) 
shorthaul −0.6903*** (0.0469) 
−0.0124 shorthaul (0.0085) 
ln(CASM) 0.1524 (0.2497) 
−0.0335*** CASM (0.0066) 
0.0505 EDLPmono (0.0466) 
0.0105 EDLPmono (0.0086) 
    
N 33937 N 714 
−2LL −20573.3 −2LL −1995.1 
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Table 13: HILO Prices in Competitive vs. 
Monopoly Markets – Price Level 
Table 14: HILO Prices in Competitive vs. 
Monopoly Markets – Price Variability 
Variable Estimate (standard error) 
Estimate Variable (standard error) 
Intercept 4.6750*** (0.1651) 
0.0703*** Intercept (0.0203) 
weekday 0.1354*** (0.0014) 
−0.0639*** weekday (0.0034) 
0.3184*** DD7 (0.0020) 
0.0644*** DD7 (0.0047) 
0.0790*** DD14 (0.0020) 
0.0555*** DD14 (0.0047) 
0.0017 DD21 (0.0020) 
0.0110** DD21 (0.0047) 
ln(freq) −0.0169*** (0.0006) 
0.0002** freq (0.0001) 
hub −0.0695*** (0.0036) 
0.0138*** hub (0.0053) 
0.0033 
shorthaul −0.4000*** (0.0489) shorthaul (0.0101) 
0.0053*** 
ln(CASM) 0.3531*** (0.0653) 
CASM (0.0009) 
0.0001  
ln(EQUIPsize) 0.0305*** (0.0099) 
EQUIPsize (0.0001) 
−0.0153* HILOmono 0.1431*** (0.0416) HILOmono (0.0090) 
    
N 238425 N 6207 
−2LL 163972.3 −2LL −6772.4 
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